The first contribution of this paper is the presentation of a Pavelka-like formulation of possibilistic logic in which the language is naturally enriched by two connectives which represent negation ( • ) and a new type of con junction ( 0). The space of truth values for this logic is the lattice of possibility functions, that, from an algebraic point of view, forms a quantal. A second contribution comes from the understanding of the new conjunction as the combination of tokens of information coming from different sources, which makes our language "dynamic" . A Gentzen calcu lus is presented, which is proved sound and complete with respect to the given seman tics. The problem of truth functionality is discussed in this context. In this many -valued view the truth value of a formula is the set of possibility distributions which satisfy it (in the usual sense). Composition of formulae through logical connectives in the language has a semantical counterpart in the corresponding composition of these sets of possibility distributions. The trick of introduc ing truth values into the language, token from Pavelka, is used in this context to account for the measure val ues from inside the language.
INTRODUCTION
The distinction between truth-functional and non truth-functional logics have been widely stressed by several authors [Dubois, Lang and Prade 91] , [Hajek et. al 94] . The first class contains many valued logics in the style of Lukasiewicz, and has been given a precise status since the work of Goguen and Pavelka (see [Pavelka 79]) ; while Pavelka proposed a general frame in which the set of truth values was a complete lattice ordered monoid, he limited his analysis to finite chains and to the unit interval of reals.
The second class contains measure-based logics, where the underlying measure can have different na tures: a probability, a possibility, a belief func tion, etc. (see, for instance, [Fagin and Halpern 94] , [ Dubois, Lang and Prade 94] , [Saffiotti 92]) . It has been given a formal status in terms of modal log ics in [Hajek et. al 94] 1 and [ Voorbraak 93] . Links 1 As a matter of facts Hajek does more than that, since he puts together a truth-functional and a measure based logic in the same framework.
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In the present paper we show that possibilistic logic can be embedded in a many-valued (truth functional) logic, where the set of truth values is not the unit interval of real numbers, but a complete lattice made of possibility distributions (more pre cisely, a quanta0 2 . Moreover, as in Pavelka and in [Takeuti and Titani 84] , we introduce in the language a suitable subset of the truth values; we show that the resulting logic, which fits in fact in Pavelka's gen eral frame, contains possibilistic logic as expressed in [ Dubois, Lang and Prade 94] .
In this many -valued view the truth value of a formula is the set of possibility distributions which satisfy it (in the usual sense). Composition of formulae through logical connectives in the language has a semantical counterpart in the corresponding composition of these sets of possibility distributions. The trick of introduc ing truth values into the language, token from Pavelka, is used in this context to account for the measure val ues from inside the language.
A second point of concern in our work is the dynamics of information. In the field of measure-based logics, it seems that most of the languages are static, in the sense that they perform inference on a unique informa tion state; no logical counterpart has been established to the combination of evidence which, semantically, is a change of information state3. In modal formu lations the 1\ operator between modal formulae like NaA can, in fact, be thought of as a connective repre senting expansion, which is a change (more precisely, a refinement) of the information state; however, no other dynamic connectives are available.
A parallel can be drawn with the representation of certain knowledge; in that case, since there is no way of weighing evidence from different sources, the only meaningful dynamic operators correspond to expan sion, revision or update. An interesting work in the direction of representing these operators as logical con nectives is [de Rijke 94] which seeks to capture the non-determinism of revision. The uncertain setting has to cope with a much wider set of operators, and we believe that it would be of a certain interest to explore their representation inside the language. For instance, it would be interesting to give a syntacti cal account of the Dempster-Shafer combination oper ator for belief functions (a syntactic characterization of Dempster conditionalization has been proposed in [Alechina and Smets 94] ), or of the Jeffrey condition alization operator for probabilities; in this paper we start this work from an easier task, which is the syn tactical representation of the Lukasiewicz combination operator in the possibilistic framework.
Let us assume that a piece of evidence is modeled by a possibility distribution on a set of possible worlds; as reported in [Dubois and Prade 85] , there are several ways of aggregating information, depending on the re lation among the sources of information, and on as sumptions on their reliability. In this paper we focus on two operators for combining possibility distribu tions: 1\ defined by ( 1r1 1\ 7rz) ( w) = 1r1 ( w) 1\ 7rz ( w) and the Lukasiewicz operator x, defined by (1r1 x 1r 2 )(w) = (1r1(w) + 7rz (w) -1) V 0; both of these operators are T-norms. The first one, up to when the result re mains consistent, can be used to model expansion, i.e. the combination of coherent information (think for instance of tokens of information coming from the same source): we represent it syntactically by "&"; it corresponds to the set union of possibilistic formu lae in the logic of [Dubois, Lang and Prade 94] , or to the 1\ between modal formulae in modal approaches.
The second operator models combination of evidence coming from distinct sources: if the two evidences agree, combination yields an evidence stronger than both4. We introduce it in the language as "® ", which has no explicit representation in standard possibilistic logic. Moreover, it is very natural to add to the lan guage a negation, which corresponds to the operation of fuzzy set complementation with respect to x. This approach, while owing much to modal approaches, as it can be argued from the semantics, differs from them in that it explicitly introduces numerical constants in the language (which, as we discussed above, are just some of the truth values), and in the semantics of negation, which we are going to discuss in some detail later. For the time being it suffice to say that modal negation deals with absence of information in some information 4this role can also be played by the product · defined by (tr 1 · 1r2)(w) = 1r1(w) · 1r2(w); in [Dubois and Prade 85 ] the authors claim that this operator models the combination of information from distinct and independent sources. The syntactical representation of this operator has been studied in [Boldrin 94]. state, while our negation represents actual disbelief.
The result is a logic endowed with a sound and com plete Gentzen calculus; we named it Dynamic Possi bilistic Logic because of the dynamic interpretation we just gave. To improve the clarity of the paper, we chose to introduce the propositional system (DPL) first (par. 2), and to extended it to the full predicative system (DPL*) in a second step (par 3). The reader could notice that our approach shares some features with Lehman's plausibility logic [ Lehman 91 ]; the substan tial difference is that Lehman seeks to capture non monotonicity, and so plausibility logic enjoys contrac tion but not weakening and full cut. On the contrary, our connective ® is monotonic but not idempotent, since it is meant to represent combination of infor mation from different sources; consequently, our logic misses out contraction but allows for cut and weaken ing. As a matter of fact, the logic happens to fall in the field of substructural logics, since it can be seen as a specialization of Girard's linear logic [Girard 87 ]. This is not surprising, in the light of the informational interpretation of substructural logics pointed out in [Wansing 93].
THE PROPOSITIONAL SYSTEM

THE SEMANTICS
We assume the following language, where a for any a E [ 0, 1] are constants. The set of atomic propositions is named .Co.
formula :: = atomic_proposition I a I --,formula I formula & formula I formula ® formula
We take .C to be the set of formulae; it is convenient to define .C1 as the set of formulae with no occurrences of a constants for any a E (0, 1) -notice that 0 and 1 are in .C1. We use upper case Latin letters (A, B, C, ... ) for formulae, while reserving L, M, N for .C1-formulae, and upper case greek letters (r, � • ... ) for multisets of formulae; the greek letters a and {3 always represent real numbers in [0, 1].
We introduce some new symbols via the definitions:
The language is the same as in [ Pavelka 79 ], where our & corresponds to 1\ and our ® to EB. Our choice of the connectives differs from Pavelka's, since we want to stress the proximity of our logic to substructural logics in the style of [Girard 87 ].
Let P denote the set of functions (which we call pos sibility distributions) from a non-empty set W to the real interval [ 0, 1] , with the order :::; ( 1r1 :::; 7rz iff fo r any w it holds that 1r1 ( w) :::; 7rz ( w)); the lattice op erations V and 1\ on possibility functions are defined with respect to the order :S; (P, V, A) is a complete lattice. The operation x is defined by 1r = 1r1 x 1r2 iff for any w 1r(w) = 0 V (1r1(w) + 1r2(w) -1)). To define the semantics of negation, we make use of fuzzy set complementation with respect to x, which makes our negation coincide with Girard's, where the incon sistent set contains only the function identically zero.
We need the following definitions:
Def. 1 1. For any 1r, ! 1r ={a E P: a::; 1r}.
2. For any o:
is the function identically equal too: {in particular 1(w) = 1 and O(w) = 0 for any w).
3. For any G � P and H � P, G ::
4. For any G � P, GJ. = G:::} {0}.
It can be easily verified that J.J. is a closure operator on 2 P (see [Girard 87] ).
Theorem 1 For any G � P, let 1rc = V nE G 7r; then:
The structure (P, x , 1) is a commutative monoid with unit, and j_ = {0} � P. Hence the structure (P, x, 1, _1_) is a phase space in Girard's sense. The closure operator is exactly the one of Girard, so the set Q = { G � P : G = GJ.J.} is the set of facts, and belongs to the class of Girard quantales as defined in [Rosenthal 90] .
A frame for our language is a couple: F = (W, Vo� where W is a nonempty set of worlds, Vo : £o � 2 is a propositional assignment over the worlds which is extended to V: £1 � 2 w , as usual.
Def. 2 Given the frame F, let us define the function II ·IIF : £ � Q :
where Necn : 2 w � [0, 1] is the necessity function as sociated to the possibility distribution 1r: N ecn(X) = 1 -V w (lX 1r(w). The x product between sets is the point to point product.
It can be verified that :
It follows from theorem 2 that IIAII as above defined is a fact (i.e. belongs to Q) for any A E £. It is worth noting that the subset B = { 1r : (Vw E W) ( 1r( w) E { 0, 1})} is a Boolean algebra contained in Q. For this reason, £1-formulae (whose value is in B -see the fourth equivalence above) behave classically.
The fifth equivalence is very important, since it states that the formula o: � L has the same meaning as the possibilistic formula (L, o:) in [Dubois, Lang and Prade 94] , or as the formula in modal flavour No:L in the style of Hajek.
Def. 3 A model is a couple K = (F, 1r) where F is a frame. We say that K f= A iff 1r E IIAII F · A formula A is valid in F iff for any model K in the frame F,
In a fixed frame a formula o: � A is true in the mod els whose possibility distribution gives A at least o: support; a formula . . ,A is true in the models which are inconsistent with the models for A; a formula A & B is true in those models which fit both A and B; and, eventually, a formula A 0 B is true in any model whose possibility distribution is the product of one of an A-model and one of a B-model. Since the lattice P is complete, we can establish a correspon dence U F : £ � P between formulae and their least informative model in a frame (keep in mind that least informative means higher in the order :S):
Theorem 2 Given a frame F, IIAII F = IIAII�J. = ! Up(A). Mo reover, the following statements hold:
for any £1-
To define the semantic entailment relation, we first consider the entailment between formulae:
A I= B iff for any frame F, Up(A):::; Up(B)
We can now state the following Theorem 3 Let the frame C = (We, V(r) be de fined as follows: We is the set of classical proposi tional valuations for Co (i. e. the set of junctions from Co to {Tr ue, False}) and V0 e (p) = { w E We :
w I= p (classically)}. Then Uc(A) :::; Uc(B) implies Up(A) :::; Up(B) for any frame F.
An important consequence of the theorem above is that we can restrict our attention to a unique quantal, which is the one made from the set of possibility dis tributions over the set We, via the closure operation.
In fact, we can define the semantic entailment relation as follows (here and in the following we write U(A) for Uc(A)):
A I= B iff U(A) :::; U(B)
Eventually, since the intended meaning of the sequent
.. B, then we say that the sequent r f--� is valid iff ® AH A I= � BEt:.. B.
Let us now briefly comment on negation. Possibilistic models on the same frame represent a state of infor mation about the possible worlds of the frame; they are informationally ordered: 1r1 :::; 1r 2 means that 1r1 is more informative then 1r 2 , since it better constrains the set of possible worlds. Since a formula is interpreted in the least informative information state which satisfies it, we have two possible readings for negation: the first is the modal one, which refers to information which is absent in a given information state. In this case the statement K I= •NaL must be read as: "in the given state of information it is not possible to prove that L is necessary at least a (while it may become possible in a refinement of the information state)" . The sec ond interpretation for negation, which we use in our logic, is an internal one, in the sense that the statement K I= -, (a -+ L) is read as: "in the given state of infor mation we definitely refuse to accept that L be neces sary at least a (and no refinement of this information state will allow to prove the opposite)". The formula • (a -+ L) then expresses an effective token of informa tion, and does not deal with absence of information. Note that, if applied to a classical framework, this sec ond reading would make -,0£ equivalent to D·L, but this is not the case here. Moreover, the reader can verify that there are models with non-zero possibility functions which satisfy both A and ·A; all of these functions are, however, smaller than 0. 5. So we tol erate that a partially consistent information state can support both a token of information and its negation.
THE PROOF SYSTEM DPL
The proof system will be given in a Gentzen-style cal culus, since it is the most comfortable way to deal with multisets (remember that, because of the absence of contraction, it does matter how many times a formula is given). Another reason for choosing this calculus is the possible generalization to cases in which other rules are not accepted (in the style of plausibility logic [Lehman 91]) . The DPL calculus consists of four parts: structural rules, logical rules, an axiom for distributiv ity, and three further "numerical" axioms for charac terizing the behaviour of constants. 
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Notes: where
1. Absorption is a weak form of contraction for £1-formulae; consider, in fact, the following deriva tion, where
By the way, the rule abs) is stronger than con traction on £1-formulae since, in exactly the same way, we also have the following (which is very much akin to Lehman's cumulative cut):
it is specific to the possibility function semantics.
3. If we omit numerical rules, the calculus deals with possibilistic logic with an arbitrary prod uct among possibility functions whose unit is 1, with the only restriction (due to weakening) that 7f 1 X 7f 2 :::; 7f1 1\ 1f2. Any involution rv such that 7f X rv 7f = 0 works as negation. Numerical rules force the times operator to represent the Lukasiewicz product, and the negation the cor responding fuzzy complementation. 4. It should be noted that from absorption) and S') it is possible to derive for any A and B in £1 and for any f3 :::; a the following sequents that strictly correspond to the rules GMP) and S) explicitly stated in [Dubois, Lang and Prade 94] :
. Also the following two sequents, which will turn out useful, can be derived as proved in lemma 3 (L and Mare in £1)):
6. We remind the reader that distributivity of® with respect to EB, i.e. the sequent (AEBB)®C + (A® C) EB ( B ® C) holds by the logical rules; we shall refer to it as ® -EB distr). In fact, also the right-to left direction of ®-& distr) can be obtained from the logical rules. Similarly, ...., def ) rule works also in the right-to-left direction.
7. The rules weakening), EB), 7'8 ) and ---+ ) can be dropped in a minimal presentation.
Soundness of this calculus is easily proved by induction on the proof length; to prove completeness we use this theorem, which provides a normal form to the formulae of the language DPL:
Theorem 4 Any formula A is provably equivalent in the calculus DPL to an &-formula, i. e. a formula
where Li are £1-formulae.
It should be noted that this theorem (whose proof is constructive) guarantees that there is a translation of our language into standard possibilistic logic (and vice-versa), since the formula &iEI(ai ---+ Li) can be thought of as the equivalent of {(Li, ai) : i E J} in the language of Dubois and colleagues.
Moreover, the presence of ® endows DPL with a dy namic dimension: assume you are given information tokens from distinct sources; to merge them, you sim ply connect the tokens by ®. Reduction of a formula to the normal form (the &-formula) can be seen as the effective process of merging information. The fact that the reduction process is not so trivial (see the proof of theorem 4) makes it clear that there is some An Algebraic Semantics for Possibilistic Logic 31 work to do for the combination of information, and this work is automatically performed by the proof system of DPL. It may be worth observing that reducibility of DPL formulae seems to be a very fortunate circum stance due to the simplicity of possibility theory; there is not guarantee, in general, that this process can be performed on logics based on more complex measures, like belief functions. We state then the main theorem:
Theorem 5 The DPL calculus is sound and complete with respect to the given semantics, i.e., for any closed multiset r and .6., the sequent r f-.6. is proved iff r F= .6..
THE PREDICATIVE SYSTEM
THE SEMANTICS
We enrich the propositional language with \!-formulae. c is the set of individual constants and n that of predicate symbols; an atomic formula has the form R(h, ... , tn) , where ti are either individual constants or variables. £0 is the set of atomic formulae.
formula :: = atomic_formula I a I ...., formula I formula & formula I formula ® formula I \lx formula
As before, we take £ to be the set of formulae and £1
the set of formulae with no occurrences of a constants.
Symbols ---+ and EB are defined as in the previous sec tion; we introduce: 3xA(x) = de f -,\fx-,A(x)
In the predicative system we took a general modal se mantics and then showed that it was possible to con sider just a canonical model (theorem 3) without loss of generality. This time we will not introduce a gen eral modal predicative semantics, since it would be very complex. We consider from the beginning just the canonical models, and define validity with respect to them. Let M(D) denote the set of classical first or der models for the language £1 on the domain D; each element w E M(D) has the form (D, Fe, FR) where Fe and FR are the interpretations of individual con stants and relation symbols. P(D) denote the set of possibility distributions from M (D) to the real inter val [ 0, 1]; P(D) is a particular choice for the set Win section 2, so we make use of definition 1 and theorem 1. It maintains the structure of phase space as in the propositional case, and we can build on it the quanta!
Let a be an arbitrary assignment for the variables on D; by a[xju] we mean the function which differs from a only on x, which is mapped to u. We define, for any £1 -formula A: 
A possibilistic model model is a couple K = (D, 7r) .
We say that K f= A iff 71" E II A IIv,u for any assignment a. Notice that, if A is a closed formula, then II A II v,u does not change for any choice of a; so for a closed formula A we let I IAIIv = I IA IID,u· We define, as in the propositional case:
Theorem 6 Given a frame F and an assignment a, I I A II v,u = II A IIiJ� =! Uv,u(A) . Moreover, the follow ing statements hold:
For any closed formula A and B we have:
A f= B iff Uv(A)::; Uv(B) for any domain D
Notice that semantical entailment is defined with re spect to all the domains D; this is a difference from the propositional case, in which we only had to refer to the canonical frame C. In algebraic terms this means that we have to check validity with respect to a class of quantales, and not only to a specific one.
THE PREDICATIVE PROOF SYSTEM DPL*
We only have to add some rules to the propositional calculus:
Structural rules: Unchanged
Logical rules: Add the following rules:
* if X is not free in r and � Distributivity: Add the following rule:
Numerical rules: Unchanged
We extend theorem 4 to the predicative case: if X Theorem 1 Any closed formula A is provably equiva lent in the calculus DPL* to an &-formula, i.e. a formula A'= &iEI(ai -Li) where Li are .C1 -formulae.
To prove validity we only have to check the new rules; the proof of completeness does not change w.r.t. that of the propositional system. Eventually, we have:
The DPL* calculus is sound and com plete with respect to the given semantics, i. e., for any closed multiset of formulae r and�' the sequent r f-� is proved iff r F= �.
PROOFS OF THEOREMS
All the omitted proofs can be found in [Boldrin and Sossai 95] .
Lemma 1 If 11"1 E I I AIIF and 11"2 ::; 11"1, then also 11"2 E I IAII F · Proof By induction on the complexity of A :
A= a : 11"1 E ll aiiF =! a implies 11" 1 ::; a. Then 11"2 ::; 11"1 ::; a, and so 11"2 E ll a ii F · A=p: Since 11"1 E II P II F, we have VwflV(p)7r1(w) = 0.
Since 11"2 ::; 11"1, V wflV(p) 11"2 (w) ::; V wflV(p) 11"1(w) = 0, hence 11"2 E II P II F· A= -.B : Since 11"1 E IIAII F = IIBI I�, we have that for any a E II B I I F, 11"1 x a = 0. Then for any a E IIBII F, 11"2 xa::; 11" 1 xa = 0, and so 11"2 E IIBII�-
Since 1r1 E IIC 1\ BIIF, by clef. 1r1 E IICIIF and 1r1 E IIBIIF· By inductive hypothesis 1r2 E IICIIF and 1r2 E IIBIIF, and then 1r2 E IIC 1\ BIIF · A= C ® B : Let 1r � E IICIIF, 7rf E IIBIIF and 1r1 = 1rf x 1rf. Take 1r 2 = 7rf, and 7r� defined as:
We have then 1r� E IICIIF by inductive hyp., since 1r� :::; 1r! (easy to see) and 1r� E IIBIIF· Moreover, 1r 2 x 1r 2 = 1r2. Hence we have proved that 1r2 E IIC ® BIIF · so the proof is over.
D
Proof of Theorem 1 1. 2) Take 1r such that 1r x 7rG = 0; then, for any ()" E G, 7f X ()" :::; 7f X 1fQ = 0, so 7f E Gl. 0 s;;; ) Take 1r such that 1r x 7r G # 0; then there is a wo such that 7r(wo)7ra(wo) > 0. Since
2) Take 1r E1 7rGi then 1r :::; 1rc, hence for any O" such that O" x 1rc = 0, we have: O" x 1r :::; 0" X 1fQ = 0 s;;; ) Take 1r � 1 1r c; then 1r 1:. 1r c, so there exists a wo such that 7r(wo) > 7rc(wo). Take now O" defined as follows: O"(w) = 1-7ra(w); clearly, it is O" x 1rc = 0, which implies O" E Gl. by the first point; it is also O"(wo) = 1-7rc(wo) > 0 since 7ra(wo) < 1, but O"(wo)7r(wo) > O"(wo)7rc(wo)7rc = 0, so O" x 1r > 0, and 7r � Gl .l. so the proof is over.
Proof of theorem 2 Let Up(A) = V IIAIIFi we prove that IIAIIF =1 Up(A), since we know from theorem 1 that IIAII � l. =1 V IIAIIF· s;;; ) is obvious.
2 ) We prove by induction that Up(A) E IIAIIFi then, by lemma 1, we know that any 1r so that 1r :::; U F (A) is in IIAIIF· (We omit the subscripts F):
A= o: : Clearly, Up( o: ) = o: , in fact: for any 1r E llo:ll , 7r :So: ; and o: E llo:ll· A= L .C1-formula: We show that Up(L)(w) =
it must be the case that Vw �V (L) 1r(w) = 0. This means that for any w � V(L), 1r(w) = 0; for wE V(L), it is certainly 1r(w):::; 1.
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• The characteristic function of V(L) stands in I lL II (easy to verify). A= ·B: We show that U(•B) = 1-U(B):
• For any 1r E II·BII, it is (theorem 1) 1r x U(B) = 0 V (1r + U(B) -1) = 0, and so 1r + U(B) -1 :::; 0. which implies 1r :::; 1 -U(B).
• 1-U(B) E II·BII, since U(B) x (1 -U(B)) = 0.
A= B & C:
We show that U(B &C) = U(B)I\ U(C):
• Take 1r E IIB&CII; by definition, 7r E l iB II and 1r E IICII· So it is 1r :::; U(B) and 1r :::; U(C) and, eventually, 1r:::; U(B) 1\ U(C).
• U(B) 1\ U(C) :::; U(B) and U(B) 1\ U(C) :::; U(C); by inductive hyp. U(B) E IIBII and
We show that U(B®C) = U(B)xU(C):
• Take 1r E IIB®CII; then there exist 1r1 E IIBII and 1r2 E IICII so that 1r = 1r1 x 1r2. Then 1r1 :::; U(B) and 1r2 :::; U(C). By monotonicity of x, 1r:::; U(B) x U(C).
• U(B) x U(C) E l iB ® Gil, since it is the product of two functions which (by induction hyp.) stand respectively in IIBII and IICII ·
The proof by induction is over; using definitions we can also calculate:
so the proof is over.
D
Lemma 2 Let B -11-&iEI(/3i --> Li) where Li are .Cl formulae, and, for any J s;;; I, O:J = • ffi j�J /3 j and
C1). Then the following derivation holds:
Lemma 3 The following sequent can be obtained in DPL for L and M in .C1:
Lemma 4 The following equivalence can be proved in DPL for any .C1-formulae L and M:
Lemma 5 The following equivalence can be proved in DPL for any £1-formula L:
Proof of theorem 5 (soundness and complete ness) Soundness is easy to prove, by induction on the derivation; as a matter of fact, logical and structural rules (apart of weakening and absorption) are sound because the interpretation structure is a Girard quan ta! (see [Girard 87]) , with the proviso that 1 coincides with T. For the others the proof is straightforward:
Let us now come to completeness; assume UF (A) � UF (B); using theorem 4 we have
We prove by induc tion on the number of elements in I that, under this
There are just two cases in which this can happen:
and f3 � a. Then by classical completeness we have L f--M, and by rule S') we have f3 f--a; hence:
Using theorem 2 we have:
It follows that there are two possibilities:
• U( & i<n-l(ai--+ Li))(w) � 1-f3 for any w such that w � V(Ln) and w � V(M). In this case it happens thatU( & i<n-l(ai--+ Li)) � U ({3 --+ M). Then we can make the simple derivation We show that U(V'xB(x) = 1\uED Uv,a[xfuj(B(x)):
• Take 7r E 1 \V'x B(x)\\ = 1\uED 1 \B(x) llv,a[x/u] i then 7r � Uv,a[xfuj(B(x)) for any u E D, hence 7r � 1\uED Uv,a[xfuj(B(x)).
• 1\uED Completeness is proved exactly as completeness of the propositional system, where references to theorem 4 are substituted by references to theorem 7. 
